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Abstract
 An Identiﬁ cation of artiﬁ cial objects is lately receiving much attention for two reasons: the problem 
of counterfeiting of artiﬁ cial objects, such as goods that use brand names, in international trade and the 
necessity of achieving a secure communication in the Internet of Things (IoT), which is a network of 
artiﬁ cial objects that are embedded with network connectivity. To identify artiﬁ cial objects, 
“ﬁ ngerprints” of artiﬁ cial objects, introduced during manufacturing and non-separable characteristics 
from artiﬁ cial objects themselves, have to be discovered. This article reports ﬁ ngerprints for acceleration 
sensors, ﬂ ash memory, non-Foster matching circuits and elemental techniques for identifying ﬁ ngerprints 
or measuring ﬁ ngerprints with stability. This article demonstrates an encoding method for recording 
ﬁ ngerprints securely in a distributed storage system.
Keyword: device ﬁ ngerprint, artiﬁ cial metrics, physical unclonable function
1.  Introduction
 The report by the organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD) warns that the 
impact of counterfeiting on international trade amounted to $250 billion in losses in 2007 [1]. The 
amount can be predicted to increase much more currently. Other reports as well as OECD’s that 
caution about the economic impact of counterfeiting have been published. From the other perspective, 
artiﬁ cial objects are also receiving much attention lately. The Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of 
artiﬁ cial objects that are embedded with electronics, software, sensors, actuators, and network 
connectivity. The identiﬁ cation of artiﬁ cial objects is essential to establish secure communication 
between artiﬁ cial objects in IoT.
 Recent developments on sensing technology allow us to identify artiﬁ cial objects one by one instead 
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of merely telling the real from the false. Identiﬁ cation methods are classiﬁ ed into two categories. The 
ﬁ rst category is to equip objects with tags that contain identiﬁ cation information. An RFID tag is the 
example of such a tag. The second category is to use the uniqueness of their physical properties. Such 
physical properties depend on random physical factors introduced during manufacturing and are 
expected to be unpredictable and uncontrollable which makes it impossible to clone properties 
precisely. The physical property used in this identiﬁ cation method is called a physical unclonable 
function (PUF) or an artiﬁ cial metrics (e.g., [2] [3]). This is an analogous concept of biometrics that 
refers to metrics related to human characteristics. Namely, this is an object’s ﬁ ngerprint. To achieve 
authentication protocols, the physical property is often combined with cryptographic technique. This 
paper focuses on methods in the second category, that is, the PUF or the artiﬁ cial metrics.
 PUFs (or PUF-like methods) have been reported for a wide variety of technologies and materials 
such as glass, paper, and electronic devices. An example of non-electronic PUFs is the random ﬁ ber 
structure of a paper. Electronic PUFs use electronic characteristics such as resistance and capacitance. 
An example of electronic PUFs is a silicon PUF that are based on the randomness of the 
semiconductor chip manufacturing process PUFs are also classiﬁ ed based on the randomness of 
objects: intrinsic randomness and non-intrinsic randomness (or explicitly-introduced). The advantage of 
use of intrinsic randomness is not to require any modiﬁ cations to the manufacturing process. Many 
articles on electronic PUFs using intrinsic randomness have been published recently. Although the 
non-intrinsic randomness usually gives a high ability to distinguish objects from one another, the 
manufacturing process has to be changed one by one to introduce non-intrinsic randomness.
 This article reports electronic PUFs using intrinsic randomness. Unlike previous works, our PUFs 
do not directly use the randomness of the semiconductor chip manufacturing process, but use the 
diﬀ erence in object’s outputs that are caused by the randomness of the semiconductor chip 
manufacturing process. That is, we focus on PUFs of mass-produced products that are designed in such 
a way that they are not purposefully equipped with PUFs.
 This article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes an acceleration-sensor metrics and discuss 
its application for individual identiﬁ cation. This section was handled by Kobayashi.
 Section 3 reports metrics on memory chips including controllers that are used for USB3.0 thumb 
drives. It is known that writing speed and reading speed depend on USB3.0 thumb drives. We focus on 
the fact that they are diﬀ erent even for the same products. This section was handled by Kambara.
 Section 4 studies metrics based on non-Foster matching circuits and proposes stabilization of their 
metrics. Non-Foster matching circuits have originally studied in the ﬁ eld of wireless communication. 
Since non-Foster matching circuits we consider that this property can be used the artiﬁ cial metrics. 
This section was handled by Horii.
 Section 5 describes encoding methods for storing metrics information in distributed storage systems. 
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Since the amount of metrics information of mass-produced objects is expected to be large, distributed 
storage systems are inevitably required. The management of metrics information requires not only the 
availability of distributed storage systems but also the conﬁ dentiality. This section proposes a secure 
regenerating code that achieves both of availability and conﬁ dentiality. Whereas previous secure 
regenerating codes are based on the informationally-secure model, the proposed code is based on the 
computationally-secure model. The advantage of the proposed code is that the size of distributed 
information to each storage nodes is smaller than that of previous secure regenerating codes. That is, 
the storage capacity of each storage nodes can be saved. This section was handled by Kuwakado.
 Section 6 concludes this paper and describes future work.
2.  Acceleration-Sensor Metrics and Individual Identiﬁ cation
2.1  Introduction
 We are studying personal authentication application using an acceleration and gyro sensor. People 
can produce a variety of motion; each motion can be used to identify each person. In previous our 
studies, as well as simple motions, even with complex motions, it has been found that personally 
identiﬁ able. Also, some research in another study area (sports science [4], zoology [5], behavioral 
analysis [6]) has used the information of the acceleration sensor, and there is an increasing demand for 
sensor information.
 The data that can be obtained from the acceleration sensor has a variation because of the status of 
the peripheral circuits. It is possible to distinguish from other individuals by capturing the 
characteristics of each sensor an individual.
 For example, acquired as time-series information from the acceleration sensor in a stationary state. 
As shown in Figure 1, the analysis of the frequency shows the components of various frequencies 
Figure 1 Frequency analysis of acceleration sensors (2 types of mobile phone)
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among two models of mobile phone.
 By applying this, it is possible to use a diﬀ erent random number seed for each individual in the 
event of random numbers, it becomes possible to use to identify individuals that owns it. In this study, 
to identify the accelerometer individuals is tried by using those samples data from a plurality of 
acceleration sensors. As a result, it was found that we can identify each of these sensors.
2.2  Acceleration Sensor Mechanism and Accuracy
 An accelerometer mounted on the portable device or the like, by MEMS (Micro Electro Mechanical 
System) technology, are manufactured as having both a mechanical structure and an integrated circuit 
structure on a semiconductor wafer. Therefore, it becomes possible to combine two of an accuracy of 
the mechanical precision and the integrated circuit; it is the present study focused on this precision. To 
come out a diﬀ erence in degree of accuracy in the manufacturing process are aware, it (voltage 
distribution and temperature characteristics obtained from 1000 individuals or more sensors) which is 
also described in Speciﬁ cation Sheet of the acceleration sensor. To further retrieve the data from the 
acceleration sensor, it is necessary to conﬁ gure the electrical and electronic circuits not least, since the 
components thereof there is a slight diﬀ erence in accuracy, it comes out the diﬀ erence in each 
manufacturing individual it is inevitably. Focusing on the accuracy of the diﬀ erence in each individual 
of these sensors (and peripheral circuit), based on the value output from the sensor, we found 
diﬀ erences in individuals, attempts to apply to identifying individuals.
2.3  Data Acquisition of the Acceleration Sensor
 The acquisition of the acceleration data is a method obtaining the program from a device with an 
acceleration sensor and a method receiving from the acceleration sensor itself directly. Acquisition of 
the data from the devices which have an accelerometer needs to prepare a large number of devices, in 
the present study, we adopted a method of obtaining from the acceleration sensor itself. In an 
accelerometer, ADXL327BCPZ of Analog Devices Inc. [7] was used and prepared that attaching a 
capacitor 0.1 MicroF to the output of the X and Y and Z axes. Input voltage is in the range of from 
1.8 to 3.6V (Figure 2).
Figure 2 Acceleration sensor: ADXL327CPZ
Artiﬁ cial Metrics of Electric Devices and Their Applications 5
 To obtain the sensor information of each axis from the evaluation circuit, we have used Raspberry 
Pi 3, which is a kind of microcomputer. The Raspberry Pi produces the power input to the acceleration 
sensor, but the Raspberry Pi doesn’t have any AD converter, so, as shown in Figure 3, the 
measurement was carried out through the AD converter using MCP3208 (12bit converter). This 
converter provides the value of the range from 0 to 4095; where, 0 volt equals to 0, and Vss voltage 
equal to 4095. Table 1 shows a few samples of the output value which are converted and generated by 
Raspberry Pi. These samples show the values of X, Y and Z axes sensors in a line. For example, the 
ﬁ rst column of the ﬁ rst line is 2054, which means the X-axis data of the sensor and the value is 
calculated with the Eq. (1):
Axisx =
4095*Voltx　　　　　　
Vss
 (1)
where Voldx is the voltage of X axis of sensor and Vss is the voltage provided to the sensor. The 
second and third column of the Figure is Y- and Z-axis data of the sensor, respectively.
Figure 3 Measurement circuits with Raspberry Pi3
Table 1 A few samples of output from the AD converter
X-axis Y-axis Z-axis
2054 2077 1393
2055 2076 1394
2054 2077 1395
2053 2079 1391
2054 2075 1397
… … …
 We have employed 8 acceleration sensors in the experiments. We put these sensors in on the same 
installation conditions and environmental conditions. Installation at the measurement evaluation circuit 
including a sensor ﬁ xed to the acrylic plate, which was kept stationary without rotation in on a stable 
base. Measurement environment is carried out on the stable desk, the experiments were performed in 
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an atmosphere without vibration, etc. (Figure 4)
Figure 4 Array of acceleration sensor evaluation boards 
2.4  Feature Extraction of the Acceleration Sensor
 We have fulﬁ lled frequency analysis of the data obtained from the acceleration sensor with a low-pass 
ﬁ lter, and the data returned to time domain are used in the identiﬁ cation of each sensor.
 To achieve the identiﬁ cation, we applied the multi-layered perceptron with the back-propagation 
algorithm. The reason why using the perceptron is that these sensor’s data are vast scale (many 
samples and patterns). The multi-layered perceptron, aka Neural Network, has the feature which adopts 
the several input parameters to the outputs vector, in other words, which ﬁ ts the output function with 
the contribution parameters. This ﬁ tting is achieved from the training the network parameters.
 In this proposal method, we apply the sensor’s output (low-passed) to the input parameters and the 
sensor individuals to the output. These combinations are from sensor’s measurements. Figure 5 shows 
the characteristics of each sensor. Each sensor has 3-dimensional data, but it is hard to use these 
complex data as input parameters. Therefore, we use the equation (2.1) to simplify these complex data. 
Equation (2) calculates the absolute value of 3-dimensional vector data.
value = √　x 2 + y 2 + z 2 . (2)
Figure 5 1-D time series of each sensor
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2.5  Experiments of Acceleration Sensor Identiﬁ cation
 The multi-layered perceptron used in experiments has seven layers; input, output and 5 middle 
layers. The number of input units is 128, the output unit is 8, and the intermediate layers has 100, 80, 
60, 40 and 20 units respectively. The training times is 40,000. The total training and test pattern is 
800; test patterns are selected from the total patterns randomly. The ratio of test patterns is 30%. We 
try to identify the acceleration sensor itself. As the results of identiﬁ cation for eight sensors, we 
achieve 100% for training datasets and almost 100% for test datasets as the rate of identiﬁ cation. The 
time of training the perceptron is several seconds. These results are the average score of 20 times 
experiments. Table 2 illustrates the part of results, trials of which has the ratio of identiﬁ cation except 
for 100% and the class of which has the ratio except for 100%. The class and trial-sets, those are not 
shown in Table 2, have the 100% identiﬁ cation ratio.
Table 2 The part of the results of identiﬁ cation ratio
trial class 1 class 8
1 100.00％ 96.00％
3 100.00％ 96.77％
6 100.00％ 97.56％
7 100.00％ 96.88％
9 100.00％ 96.55％
14 96.77％ 100.00％
17 96.67％ 100.00％
18 100.00％ 93.94％
average 99.67％ 98.89％
2.6  Conclusion
 We tried to identify the acceleration sensor itself. As the results of identiﬁ cation for 8 sensors, we 
achieved almost 100% as the rate of identiﬁ cation with multi-layered perceptron. However, because 
almost all results show 100% identiﬁ cation ratio, the structure of a neural network is overﬁ tting with 
training datasets. In the future studies, we plan to grab each sensor’s characteristics and apply them to 
the individual identiﬁ cation.
3.  Extraction of Memory-Chip Metrics
3.1  On Extraction of Memory-Chip Metrics
 In recent years, authentication using a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) that generates chip 
speciﬁ c values using variations occurring by chance at the time of manufacture attracts attention [8]. In 
this authentication, inputting data on the chip gives unique output data from each chip. By registering 
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this unique output data in the server and referring at the time of authentication, authentication of the 
chip becomes possible.
 In this research, we aim to make it possible to identify each USB 3.0 ﬂ ash memory (USB memory) 
by extracting device speciﬁ c characteristic quantities in USB memory like PUF. In previous research 
[9] [10], we veriﬁ ed whether it is visually distinguishable by acquiring data on whether arbitrary USB 
memory can be identiﬁ ed in some USB memories and graphing it based on it. In this chapter, using the 
write speed obtained from the USB memory, etc., it is actually executed using machine learning and 
decision tree whether each USB memory can be actually identiﬁ ed, and data necessary for the decision 
tree is speciﬁ ed it is aimed at.
3.2  Measurement Method
 USB memory used for measurement is 16 GB products of 6 manufacturers sold in the market (Table 
3). In addition, in the ELECOM, it was prepared a plurality of the same model number. File system of 
USB memory of the experimental subject is a NTFS.
 [Measurement Method]: In order to check the transfer speed for these USB memories, the 
performance monitor attached to Microsoft Windows 8.1 was used. As a ﬁ le to be transferred, it was 
prepared those of 0.5GB that was ﬁ lled with byte data of 0x00. Measurement was performed 10 times 
with writing to USB memory and reading from USB memory set. Between writing and reading, 
processing for unmounting volumes was performed once in order to invalidate the cache. Then, in 
order to check whether there is a diﬀ erence in transfer speed depending on the data already written, we 
added a ﬁ le of 0.5 GB and measured 28 times.
Table 3 Measured USB memories
Manufacturer’s name Model number
ELECOM MF-RDSU3 16G
TOSHIBA TransMemory-MX V3KMM-016G-BK
BUFFALO RUF3-WB16G-BK
I-O DATA BUM-3C16G/K
TDK Prime Line UFD16GE-PL3
SanDisk SDDD2-016G-G46
3.3  Experiment
 Weka [11] was used for construction and evaluation of decision trees.
 [About Small Data]: Measurement data was obtained by writing data of 0.5 GB and writing data 
of 0.5 GB consecutively to the 7 USB memories of ELECOM. The data used to construct the decision 
tree was 280 times of 10 × 28 for each USB memory. For all USB memories, it is 1980 times of data 
of 7 × 280. Also, the size of the tree and the number of correctly classiﬁ ed instances did not change 
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even if static elements were deleted.
 Table 4 shows the elements used to construct the decision tree to determine what the important 
factor in constructing the decision tree is. At the time of measurement, what we do not change in value 
depending on turns is called static element, and what changes value by turn is called dynamic element 
here.
Table 4 Static elements and dynamic elements
Static Element
Target memory name · Capacity already written · 
Capacity of written ﬁ le
Dynamic Element
A write speed average over the whole / B Write 
time on the whole / C First write average speed / D 
ﬁ rst maximum write speed (per second) / E second 
write average speed / F second maximum write 
speed (per second)
 The number of correctly classiﬁ ed instances by the decision tree when using all this element was 
91.47%. The size of the decision tree was 61 and the number of leaves was 31.
 Table 5 shows the number of correctly classiﬁ ed instances, the size of trees, and the number of 
leaves in case of removing some elements.
Table 5 Relationship between excluded elements and correctly classiﬁ ed instances
Excluded Dynamic 
Elements
Correctly Classiﬁ ed 
Instances 
Size of Tree Number of Leaves
No exclusion 91.47％ 61 31
A 91.42％ 61 31
B 91.83％ 47 24
C 91.78％ 51 26
D 86.07％ 61 31
E 91.78％ 51 26
F 90.30％ 39 20
AB 91.63％ 53 27
CD 86.32％ 55 28
EF 90.51％ 35 18
CE 92.04％ 47 24
DF 72.96％ 63 32
ABCE 91.78％ 35 18
 Deleting a dynamic element and having extremely fewer instances correctly classiﬁ ed correctly 
than when including all included cases when deleting one or two maximum speeds. Also, those that 
deleted and the number of correctly classiﬁ ed instances increased was B · C · E. When ABCE is 
deleted since the number of correctly classiﬁ ed instances has become less than when deleting only CE, 
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we think that the total time and so on are slightly aﬀ ected. When I checked the branch of the 
constructed decision tree, since D or F frequently occurred, I think that the most important factor is the 
maximum speed per second.
 [For Large Scale Data]: When trying to construct a decision tree for the data acquired in the previous 
study [9] [10], only the ABCD of the dynamic element and the static element are available in Table 4. 
The number of data is 1400 in total, 10 times the size of write data (0.5 / 1/2/4/8 GB) × the data size 
already written (28 times per 0.5 GB) for one USB memory. Because it is acquired for a total of 14 
pieces of USB memory is approximately 20,000 of data.
 Construct a decision tree for this 20 thousand data. At this time, the number of correctly classiﬁ ed 
in-stances was 71.47%. The tree size was 2037 and the number of leaves was 1019. Construct the 
decision tree for ELECOM and other USB memories respectively. When constructing a decision tree 
other than ELECOM, the number of correctly classiﬁ ed instances was 72.89%. The tree size was 463 
and the number of leaves was 232. In contrast, if ELECOM is the only target, the number of correctly 
classiﬁ ed instances was 79.31%. At this time the tree size was 271 and the number of leaves was 136. 
From these facts, it was conﬁ rmed that by identifying the same type of USB memory at the same time, 
the number of correctly classiﬁ ed instances increases. Also it was conﬁ rmed that the number of 
incorrectly classiﬁ ed instance for slow USB memory has become many.
3.4  Conclusions
 In this chapter, the extraction of the matrix of the USB memory was discussed. For the identiﬁ cation 
of the USB memory, the maximum speed when several ﬁ les are written diﬀ ers for each USB memory, 
and it is possible to distinguish which USB memory is about 80% when building a decision tree with 
only that element alone all right. From this, it is thought that the identiﬁ cation accuracy increases when 
there are multiple data of USB memory of the same maker, but the size of the tree also increases in the 
same way. Since writing the 0.5 GB ﬁ le and measuring the maximum speed, since it takes 14 to 25 
seconds to write once, if it can measure at high speed by changing the ﬁ le size or the like, the 
identiﬁ cation speed because think that it is also possible to improve, I want to advance the 
investigation.
4.  Stabilization of Circuit Metrics based on Matching Circuits
4.1  Introduction
 With the great expectations for upcoming 5G mobile communications and Internet of Things (IoT), 
built-in antennas of wireless communication systems are strongly required to design more compact and 
broadband. However, since the well-known theoretical limitation called “Chu Limit” deﬁ nes conﬂ icting 
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relationship between operational frequency bandwidth and antenna dimensions [12], super compact 
broadband antennas cannot be realized by the conventional impedance matching technologies.
 Recently, non-Foster impedance matching, utilizing non-Foster elements such as negative capacitors 
and negative inductors, drawn great attentions among antenna researchers as a new technology to 
provide broader impedance matching [13] [14] [15]. When an E-ﬁ eld-resonance-based electrically small 
antenna (ESA) is designed, real part of the antenna impedance (radiation resistance) becomes smaller, 
while imaginary part of the impedance (capacitance at this time) becomes signiﬁ cant. In such a case, 
by connecting an appropriate negative capacitor in series to the antenna, undesired antenna capacitance 
can be canceled by the negative capacitor, leading to broadband antenna matching beyond the 
conventional theoretical limitation.
 The non-Foster reactance is an unusual component [16]. When an applied voltage is increasing, 
conventional capacitors will be charged. However, in case of the negative capacitor, the capacitor will 
be discharged against the applied voltage [17]. A negative impedance converter (NIC), conﬁ gured by 
active elements and positive feedback loops, generates sign-reversed impedance of an impedance 
element connected to the NIC. Therefore, if a capacitor is connected to the NIC as the impedance 
element, the NIC will generate negative capacitance. However, the NIC easily becomes unstable 
because of the positive feedback loop. In Section 4, three types of NICs, that is, a bipolar-transistor-
based ﬂ oating NIC, a bipolar-transistor-based grounded NIC, and an operational-ampliﬁ er-based NIC, 
are introduced and their theoretical and experimental performances are summarized. Finally, feasibility 
of the non-Foster elements as metrics of circuits and devices is discussed.
4.2  Bipolar-Transistor-Based Floating NICs2)
 Figure 6a shows circuit conﬁ guration of a bipolar-transistor-based ﬂ oating NIC [18]. Bias circuits 
and ﬁ lters to control feedback loop gains are not presented in this ﬁ gure for better understanding of the 
operational principle of the NIC. Apart from DC bias voltages, let’s consider only alternative currents 
(AC) here. The notations in the ﬁ gure v1, v2, va, and vb denote AC voltages on corresponding nodes, 
and i1 and is are AC currents of corresponding circuit branches. Assume that base current of 
transistors is small enough comparing with the collector and emitter currents, and it can be ignored. In 
addition, the base and emitter voltages of each transistor are assume to be the same in terms of AC 
voltages. Under such assumptions, Eqs. (3), (4), and (5) are obtained as shown in Figure 6b. By 
substituting these results into Eq. (6), an impedance ZL, connected to the NIC, is sign-reversed into 
-ZL as shown by Eq. (6). This means that the circuit in Figure 6a works as a 2-port ﬂ oating NIC.
 Figure 6c shows a prototype NIC designed at VHF and UHF bands. The circuit patterns on printed 
 2） Refer to articles [17] [25] [32] [34] [35] [23] for more information about this subsection.
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circuit board (PCB) were made by using a milling machine LPKF Protomat S100, and all circuit 
elements including transistors Renesas NE68133 and other surface mounted devices (SMDs) were 
soldered on the PCB by cream solder. As an ESA, a monopole antenna operating at 1 GHz was 
connected to Port 2 of the NIC. For simulations, the monopole antenna was modeled by the series 
connection of a 3 ohm resistor, a 10 nH inductor, and a 3.0 pF capacitor.
 Input impedance and return loss characteristics of the NIC are shown in Figure 6d when the 
monopole antenna is connected to the NIC. The graphs on left-hand side and right-hand side of this 
ﬁ gure present simulated and measured results, respectively. It can be conﬁ rmed that the NIC provides 
better impedance matching at 600 MHz in simulation and 300 MHz in experiment. In this 
demonstration, we found following features on this NIC.
 1) The NIC circuit requires three types of ﬁ lters on the feedback loop to control the loop gain 
precisely; one for gain suppression at lower frequencies and two at higher frequencies. If the feedback 
loop gain is controlled appropriately, the NIC works quite stable.
 2) The NIC circuit strongly requires that the AC signals should be blocked perfectly not to ﬂ ow 
into the DC biasing circuits. To do this, high performance inductors are indispensable.
 3) If high performance inductors are not available, use of current mirrors, resistors and high DC 
biasing will be useful as an alternative way [14].
Figure 6 Bipolar-transistor-based ﬂ oating negative impedance converters
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4.3  Bipolar-Transistor-Based Grounded NICs3)
 Figure 7a shows circuit conﬁ guration of a bipolar-transistor-based grounded NIC [18]. Bias circuits 
and ﬁ lters to control feedback loop gains are not presented in this ﬁ gure. Similarly, let’s consider only 
the AC eﬀ ects. An input voltage vin is almost equal to the base voltage of vb of Tr1, as shown in Eq. 
(4.5). The node voltage vc is also equal to the emitter voltage vd of Tr2 as presented in Eq. (8). Since 
the emitter current is approximately the same with the collector current, an input current iin ﬂ ows 
through Tr1, node c and impedance ZL. As a result, Eq. (9) is obtained for ZL. When a loop current iR 
is deﬁ ned as shown by Figure 7a, Eqs. (10) and (11) are obtained for R1 and R2, respectively. Finally, 
by solving these equations, Eq. (12) is derived. This equation means that the NIC response, Zin = -ZL, 
is obtained when R1 = R2. Figure 7c shows a prototype model of the NIC working at VHF and UHF 
bands. This circuit was also fabricated on the PCB board by using the same procedure as mentioned in 
Sec.4.2. For transistors, Renesas NE68133 was used.
 In simulations, not only circuit simulator ADS, but also EM-ﬁ eld solver Momentum was utilized 
to evaluate the NIC performance precisely. In experiment, a vector network analyzer 8714B was 
connected to Port 1 of the NIC, and input impedance was measured. From imaginary part of the input 
impedance, generated capacitance was calculated and given in Figure 7d. We have still some errors 
between simulation and experiment, frequency dependence of these responses are quite similar. The 
error would be caused due to unexpected inductance induced on the actual NIC and PCB circuits.
 3） Refer to article [30] for more information about this subsection.
(a) Simplified NIC circuit      
(c) Fabricated NIC     (d) Performance         
(b) Equations      
100 200 300 400 500 600 700-80
-60
-40
-20
0
Frequency (MHz)
Ca
pa
cit
an
ce 
(pF
)
 Simulation with ADS & Mom.
 Measured
     
     
    
1     
2      
= = െ 1
2
  
Figure 7 Bipolar-transistor-based grounded negative impedance converters
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4.4  Operational-Ampliﬁ er-Based Grounded NICs4)
 Figure 8a shows circuit conﬁ guration of an operational-ampliﬁ er-based grounded NIC. This circuit 
can be analyzed by applying the following approximations widely applied for ideal operational 
ampliﬁ ers (OPamps). That is,
  1) input impedance is inﬁ nity (currents ﬂ owing into input ports can be ignored),
  2) output impedance is zero,
  3) amplitude ratio is inﬁ nity (voltages at both input ports can be treated as identical).
 Based on this approximation, Eqs. (13) - (18) shown in Figure 8b are obtained. By solving these 
equations, an input impedance of the NIC Zin can be derived as Eq. (19). If the relation Eq. (20) is 
assumed, Zin in Eq. (19) becomes Eq. (21). This means that the circuit works as a grounded NIC.
 Figure 8c shows a photograph of a prototype fabricated on PCB. AS for OPamps, Texas Instruments 
OPA690 was selected. As a sign-reversed impedance Zin, a capacitor C0 with capacitance of 100pF 
was connected. Two models with R0 = 20 ohm and R0 = 39 ohm were demonstrated and the results are 
shown in Figure 8d. When R0 = 39 ohm, the NIC generates negative capacitance successfully in 
theory, but it shows unstable response in experiment. On the other hand, when R0 = 20 ohm, negative 
capacitance around -500pF is obtained experimentally. We have studied OPamp-based NICs afterwards, 
and ﬁ nally, we concluded that OPamp-based NICs were not suitable to generate non-Foster reactance 
because the inner parameters of the OPamp package cannot be controlled from the outside.
 4） Refer to articles [31] [22] [27] [28] [33] [36] [24] [29] for more information about this subsection.
Figure 8 Operational-ampliﬁ er-based grounded negative impedance converters
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4.5  Feasibility of Non-Foster Reactance as Metrics of Wireless Communication Systems5)
 Non-Foster impedance matching for ESAs is the most promising and indispensable technique for 
antenna design to realize high-speed wireless data communication systems. However, it is also true that 
the non-Foster reactance suﬀ ers from the inﬂ uence of environmental conditions. For instance, tolerance 
of resistance, capacitance, inductance and amplitude ratio of transistors (those are conﬁ guring the NIC 
circuit) aﬀ ects total performance of the NIC. As a result, every NIC shows its own peculiar feature in 
their frequency domain and time domain responses. Generally, such nonidentical behavior should be 
avoided from industrial products. However, from the view point of device metrics, this feature will be 
useful to identify wireless communication systems and instruments. We believe that the non-Foster 
reactance will be a key technology for future highly-secured wireless communication systems.
5.  Secure Encoding Method for Saving Metrics
5.1  Regenerating Codes
 Large-scale storage systems that save their artiﬁcial metrics play an essential role in operating a 
system for distinguishing artiﬁcial objects. Since component failures in storage systems often happen, 
data have to been stored in redundant ways to ensure their availability. Regenerating codes [19] allow 
us to encode a message (original data) to n shares in such a way that the following properties are 
satisﬁed: (i) reconstruction: the message can be reconstructed from any k shares, (ii) regeneration: any 
share can be regenerated from any d pieces that are computed from shares. The eﬃ  cient regeneration 
is a remarkable property of regenerating codes. This property allows us to shorten the downtime of a 
storage system.
 Since the seminal paper [19] was published, many regenerating codes have been proposed. In 
addition to above-mentioned n, k, d, regenerating codes have the following parameters: α is the size of 
a share, β is the size of a piece, and B is the size of a message. These are usually counted by the 
number of appropriate symbols (e.g., symbols in a ﬁnite ﬁeld). The parameters are written as [n, k, d, 
α, β, B].
 Although the objective of regenerating codes originally is to improve the availability of distributed 
storage systems, the conﬁdentiality of data is often a property required for distributed storage systems. 
Regenerating codes for achieving the conﬁdentiality, called secure regenerating codes, have been 
proposed in article [20]. However, previous works on secure regenerating codes are based on 
information-theoretical security. It causes ineﬃ  cient storage usage. Speciﬁcally, the amount of data 
after encoding is several times as much as that before encoding. To solve the problem on ineﬃ  gcient 
 5） Refer to article [26] for more information about this subsection.
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storage usage, this section describes a secure regenerating code based on computational security. The 
amount of data after encoding in our secure regenerating code is almost equal to that before encoding.
5.2  Security Deﬁ nition
 The proposed encoding scheme consists of two phases. First, a message is transformed into a pseudo- 
message by using an all-or-nothing transform. After that, the pseudo-message is encoded with a 
regenerating code. The all-or-nothing transform is a transform such that any symbol of the pseudo- 
message is lost, no information on the message is obtained from remaining symbols of the pseudo- 
message. Owing to the above-mentioned property of the all-or-nothing transform, this composite 
scheme seems to work well. Unfortunately, it is not true. A counter example was given in article [21]. 
The previous deﬁnition of the all-or-nothing transform, which was given in article [21], is not suitable 
for discussing the composite scheme; since it assumes that a symbol of the pseudo-message is lost, it 
does not provide the security when the linear combination of symbols is lost. We here describe a new 
deﬁnition of the all-or-nothing transform that is suitable for discussing the composite scheme.
 Deﬁ nition 1 Let O be an oracle that performs Π = (E, D). For a probabilistic algorithm (an adversary) 
A and b∈{0, 1}, deﬁ ne an experiment Exp aonΠ (A, b) as follows.
 1. The adversary A prepares two distinct messages (m1, …, mB), (m̑1, …, m̑B), and auxiliary 
information s that may be some hints when the two messages are produced. The adversary gives the 
two messages to the oracle O.
 2. The oracle chooses a bit b∈{0, 1} at random. If b = 0, then (z1, …, zB’) ← E ((m1, …,, mB)). 
Otherwise (z1, …, zB’) ← E ((m̑1, …, m̑B)). Suppose that zi in the pseudo-message (z1, …, zB’) can be 
regarded as an element of a ﬁ nite ﬁ eld Fp. that contains p elements.
 3. The adversary gives a (B’－1) × B’ matrix U that causes the loss of a symbols. Note that U is 
not square, B’－1 rows in U may be linearly dependent, and all the elements are in Fp.
  u1,1 ⋯ u1, B’
 U = ( ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ )  uB’－1,1 ⋯ uB’－1, B’
 4. The oracle returns v1, …, vB’－1 given by
( v1⋮vB’－1) = U (
z1…
zB’ ) over Fp. (22)
 5. The adversary guesses the value of b from v1, …, vB’－1, and auxiliary information s, which results 
in the value of Exp aonΠ (A, b).
The advantage of A is deﬁ ned as
Adv aonΠ (A) = | Pr (Exp aonΠ (A, 1) = 1)－Pr (Exp aonΠ (A, 0) = 1) |,
and the advantage of Π is deﬁ ned as
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Adv aonΠ (q) = max
A
 Adv aonΠ (A)
where q is the number of queries to underlying oracles that are used by E and D if they exist. If 
AdvaonΠ (q) is not larger than some criterion, then Π is called to be an all-or-nothing transform in the 
sense of this deﬁ nition.
 The diﬀ erence from the previous deﬁ nition is Eq. (22). The previous deﬁ nition assumes that one 
pseudo-message symbol is lost. This assumption means that U is a matrix that is obtained by deleting 
the i-th row from the identity matrix. When a transform conﬁ rms to the deﬁ nition above, even if any 
linear transform is performed after the transform, the property of an all-or-nothing transform is not 
compromised.
 The previous deﬁ nition of secure regenerating codes is in the information-theoretically secure model. 
We relax the deﬁ nition of secure regenerating codes to the computationally secure model that is based 
on the indistinguishability of two messages. The following deﬁ nition means that no information about 
the message is obtained from shares and pieces.
 Deﬁ nition 2 Let O be an oracle that performs an [n, k, d, α, β, B] regenerating code Ω = (P, Q, R) 
where P, Q, and R denote an encoding, a reconstructing, and a regenerating algorithm, respectively. An 
experiment for an adversary A, denoted by Exp srΩ (A, b), is deﬁ ned as follows.
 1.  The adversary A produces two distinct messages, that is, ((m1, …, mB), (m̑1, …, m̑B), s) ← A 
where message symbols mi, m̑i are elements in Fp and s denotes auxiliary information. The 
adversary gives the two messages to the oracle O. Note that if the oracle uses other oracles, the 
adversary can make queries to the oracles.
 2.  The oracle chooses a bit b∈{0, 1} at random. If b = 0, then C ← P ((m1, …, mB)), otherwise C 
← P ((m̑1, …, m̑B))
 3.  The adversary asks the oracle to give τ (≤ l ) shares and μ (≤ u) piece vectors, which are denoted 
by
(c(i1), …, c(iτ)), (v (if 1,1, …, if 1, d)f1 , …, v (if u,1, …, ifμ, d)fμ ),
   respectively. The oracle uses algorithms Q, R to compute them. Note that if the oracle uses other 
oracles to compute them, the adversary can make queries to the other oracles.
 4.  The adversary guesses the value of b, which results in the value of Exp srΩ (A, b).
The advantage of A is deﬁ ned as
Adv srΩ (A) = |Pr [Exp srΩ (A, 1) = 1]－Pr [Exp srΠ (A, 0) = 1] |,
and the advantage of Ω is deﬁ ned as
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Adv srΩ (q) = max
A
 Adv srΩ (A),
where q is the number of queries to oracles. If AdvsrΩ (q) is not larger than some criterion, then Ω is an 
[n, k, d, α, β, B, l, μ] secure regenerating code.
5.3  Proposed Encoding Method
 Our encoding method is the combination of any existing regenerating code and an all-or-nothing 
transform that is newly designed to be used for this method. The all-or-nothing transform is 
implemented with a practical blockcipher such as AES and its security is proved in the ideal cipher 
model. We here describe a new all-or-nothing transform Π = (E, D) where E and D are the forward 
transform and the backward one, respectively. Suppose that Enc is the encryption of an ideal cipher 
{0, 1}ζ × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l, that is, Enc is a keyed permutation from a ζ-bit key and an l-bit message 
to an l-bit ciphertext.
Figure 9 New all-or-nothing transform
 The algorithm of E is as follows (Figure 9). Let (m1, …, mB) be a message where mi∈{0, 1}l and 
ζ ≥ l + log2 (2B). Choose a pseudo-key κ from {0, 1}l uniformly at random. For i = 1, …, B, compute 
a pseudo-message symbol zi as
zi = Enc (κ || i, mi),
where || denotes the concatenation operator of strings. Next, for i = 1, …, B, compute wi as
wi = End (zi || (B + i), e), (23)
where e is a public constant value (say, all zero bits). Compute the last pseudo-message symbol zB + 1 as
zB + 1 = κ ⊕ w1 ⊕ … ⊕ wB.
Finally, output z = (z1, …, zB + 1) as a pseudo-message.
 The transform above E is invertible. Its backward transform D is given as follows. Given the pseudo-
message z = (z1, …, zB + 1), compute wi with Eq. (23) for i = 1, …, B. The pseudo-key κ can be obtained 
by
κ = zB + 1 ⊕ (w1 ⊕ … ⊕ wB).
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By using κ, the message (m1, …, mB) can be obtained by
mi = Dec (κ || i, zi)
where Dec is the decryption function of Enc.
 Lemma implies that Π = (E, D) is the all-or-nothing transform in the sense of Deﬁ nition 1 if the 
number of queries to the ideal cipher is much less than 2l. The proof has been given in article [21].
 Lemma 1 The advantage of Π in the sense of Deﬁ nition 1 is given by
Adv aonΠ (q) ≤ 
2(2B + 3)q
　　　　 　
2l－q
,
where q is the number of queries to the ideal cipher.
 The combination of the all-or-nothing transform Π and any regenerating code, denoted by Ω, 
provides a secure regenerating code. The algorithm of Ω is as follows. Given a message (m1, …, mB)∈
{0, 1}lB where mi∈{0, 1}l, compute a pseudo-message (z1, …, zB + 1)∈{0, 1}l(B + 1) using E of Π. Consider 
the pseudo-message as a vector over F2 l, that is, (z1, …, zB + 1)∈ FB + 12l . For the pseudo-message, produce 
a share c(i) = (c(i)1 , …, c (i)α )∈F α2l of node i using any [n, k, d, α, β, B + 1] linear regenerating code G 
over F2 l. The reconstruction and the regeneration are omitted.
 The advantage of Ω is that the overhead caused by achieving the security is only one symbol 
regardless of B. Hence, the overhead is negligible as B is suﬃ  ciently large. Since previous secure 
regenerating codes requires random symbols as many as message symbols, the overhead cannot be 
negligible even if B is suﬃ  ciently large. This composite scheme Ω is trivially an [n, k, d, α, β, B] 
regenerating code. The following theorem that was proved in article [21] shows that Ω is a secure 
regenerating code. The premise of the advantage in the following theorem is mainly Lemma 1.
 Theorem 1 Suppose that an [n, k, d, α, β, B + 1] linear regenerating code is used. The composite 
scheme Ω is an [n, k, d, α, β, B, l, μ] secure regenerating code where 0 ≤ μ ≤ l if
(l－μ) α + μdβ ≤ B.
 The advantage of Ω is given by
Adv srΩ (q) ≤ 
2(2B + 3)q
　　　　　
2l－q
.
6.  Concluding Remarks
 Hardware security including physical unclonable functions, device ﬁ ngerprints, and artiﬁ cial metrics 
etc. have attracted attention over a few years. For example, the research group on hardware security 
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has been established in the Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers, which 
is the largest academic society on these ﬁ eld in Japan. Research conferences on hardware security have 
been held in not only Japan but also Europe and the United States.
 In consideration of such research trend, we launch research on device ﬁ ngerprints. This project 
covered device ﬁ ngerprints of several diﬀ erent devices and storage systems for device ﬁ ngerprints. 
Unlike previous works, we focused on the diﬀ erence in object’s outputs that are caused by the 
randomness of the semiconductor chip manufacturing process. Although industrial products are 
generally expected to deliver the same quality, we empirically know that there is an individual 
diﬀ erence in the same industrial products. The objective of this project is to quantify the magnitude of 
such individual diﬀ erences.
 This article summarized results obtained by the project “Further development of identiﬁ cation 
technology based on device ﬁ ngerprints.” Although each of results were described as in this article, we 
have two future works: Our device ﬁ ngerprints are not solidly stable because they are not purposefully 
equipped with devices. Hence, more precise methods of measuring the characteristic of device 
ﬁ ngerprints are required. Another is to evaluate degrading with age of device ﬁ ngerprints.
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